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Note
The Protection of Land Decrees: The Use of Lis
Pendens in Interstate Litigation Affecting
California Real Property
A notice of lis pendens' in California is a recorded document that
informs all interested persons, through actual or constructive notice, of
the institution of an action that may affect title to the property against
which the notice is recorded.2 Litigants utilize lis pendens to prevent the
frustration of judgments by the transfer of property during the pendency
of an action.3 Under the common law doctrine of lis pendens, a transferee or encumbrancer of real property is deemed to have constructive
notice of ongoing litigation affecting that property and, though not a
party to the action, is bound by the outcome. 4 Under California statutory law, litigants may file a statutory notice of lis pendens in actions that
affect the title to or possession of real property. 5 Use of lis pendens, howl. Literally, "a pending suit." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 840 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). In
this Note the terms "lis pendens," "notice of lis pendens," and "notice of pendency" will be
used interchangeably.
2. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 409(a) (West Supp. 1984).
3. See Allied E. Fin. v. Goheen Enters., 265 Cal. App. 2d 131, 132, 71 Cal. Rptr. 126,
127 (1968); Carr v. Lewis Coal Co., 96 Mo. 149, 157, 8 S.W. 907, 909 (1888). See generally 51
AM. JUR. 2D Lis Pendens § 1 (1970 & Supp. 1984); 54 C.J.S. Lis Pendens § 1 (1948).
4. See Richardson v. White, 18 Cal. 102, 106 (1861); Kendall-Brief Co. v. Superior
Court, 60 Cal. App. 3d 462, 468, 131 Cal. Rptr. 515, 519 (1976); Allied E. Fin. v. Goheen
Enters., 265 Cal. App. 2d 131, 132, 71 Cal. Rptr. 126, 127 (1968); Stewart v. Wheeling & L.E.
Ry. Co., 53 Ohio 151, 163, 41 N.E. 247, 250 (1895). The doctrine of lis pendens has been
described as the extension of the rule of res judicata to those not a party to the action. Laurence, Lis Pendens, 56 N.D.L. RFv. 327, 327 (1980). It has also been described as the exception at common law to the general rule that one not a party to a suit is not affected by the
judgment. Kendall-Brief Co. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. App. 3d at 468, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 519.
5. In an action concerning real property or affecting the title or the right of possession of real property, the plaintiff, at the time of filing the complaint, and the defendant, at the time of filing a cross-complaint, or at any time afterwards, may record in
the office of the recorder of the county in which the property is situated, a notice of
the pendency of the action, containing the names of the parties, and the object of the
action or cross-action, and a description of the property in that county affected
thereby. This section authorizes a notice of an action concerning real property pending in any United States district court to be recorded and indexed in the same manner and in the same place as herein provided with respect to notices of action pending
in courts of this state. From the time of filing such notice for record only, shall a
purchaser or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby be deemed to have con-
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ever, is not limited to in rem proceedings. In personam actions may also
affect property in a manner that justifies the filing of a notice of lis
pendens. 6 Actions that qualify for the protection of a lis pendens in California include foreclosure on liens against real property,7 rescission of
contracts for the sale of realty,8 specific performance of contracts to convey realty, 9 and imposition of constructive trusts on real property.' 0
These in personam proceedings, brought in equity to determine the
rights of individuals, may be adjudicated by any court that has personal
jurisdiction over the parties even if the actions involve realty located in
another state." As a general rule, a court of one state may not directly
affect title to land located in another state. 12 The rights determined and
remedies available in such actions nonetheless indirectly may affect the
3
title or possession of real property located outside the forum state.'
If brought in California, these in personam proceedings would justify the recordation of a lis pendens.14 It is unclear, however, whether a
lis pendens may be filed in California in connection with an action that
structive notice of the pendency of the action as it relates to the real property and
only of its pendency against parties designated by their real names.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 409(a) (West Supp. 1984).
6. An action for a monetary judgment alone, however, does not affect property for purposes of the statutory lis pendens law. Coppinger v. Superior Court, 134 Cal. App. 3d 883,
892, 185 Cal. Rptr. 24, 30 (1982); Empfield v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 105, 108, 108
Cal. Rptr. 375, 377 (1973); Allied E. Fin. v. Goheen Enters., 265 Cal. App. 2d 131, 133-34, 71
Cal. Rptr. 126, 127-28 (1968).
7. Page v. W.W. Chase Co., 145 Cal. 578, 582, 79 P. 278, 279 (1904).
8. Wilkins v. Oken, 157 Cal. App. 2d 603, 606, 321 P.2d 876, 878 (1958).
9. Abbott v. 76 Land & Water Co., 161 Cal. 42, 51, 118 P. 425, 429 (1911).
10. Coppinger v. Superior Court, 134 Cal. App. 3d at 890-91, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 29.
11. See, e.g., Massie v. Watts, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 148, 160 (1810); Rozan v. Rozan, 49
Cal. 2d 322, 330-31, 317 P.2d 11, 15 (1957). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 53, 55 (1971) (decrees affecting acts or things in other jurisdictions).
12. Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 11 (1909); Redwood Inv. Co. v. Exley, 64 Cal. App. 455,
459, 221 P. 973, 975 (1923).
13. Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. at 8-11; Mills v. Mills, 147 Cal. App. 2d 107, 118, 305 P.2d
61, 68 (1956). See generally Currie, Full Faith and Credit to ForeignLand Decrees, 21 U. CHI.
L. REV. 620, 620-31 (1954); Hancock, Full Faith and Credit to ForeignLaws and Judgments in
Real Property Litigation: The Supreme Court and the Land Taboo, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1299,
1310-14 (1966). For example, an action for specific performance of a contract to convey realty
located in California may be adjudicated in State X. The decree by the court of State X ordering the conveyance of the California property may be enforced by the forum court through its
jurisdiction over the parties. See Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. at 8-11; Mills v. Mills, 147 Cal. App.
2d at 116-17, 305 P.2d at 67-68. The decree of the court in State X may also be enforced in
California by an action or special proceeding based on the out-of-state judgment. Redwood
Inv. Co. v. Exley, 64 Cal. App. at 459, 221 P. at 975; CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1913 (West
1983). California courts will give res judicata effect to issues adjudicated in the equitable action under the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution. Barber v. Barber,
51 Cal. 2d 244, 331 P.2d 628 (1958); Rozan v. Rozan, 49 Cal. 2d 322, 317 P.2d 11 (1957);
Taylor v. Taylor, 192 Cal. 71, 218 P. 756 (1923).
14. See supra notes 7-10 & accompanying text.
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has been commenced in another state. 15 Common law restrictions on the
doctrine of lis pendens, as well as questions of territorial sovereignty and
extending lis pendens protection to parstate policy, could weigh against
16
ties in extraterritorial actions.
This Note examines California lis pendens law to determine whether
a notice of lis pendens may be filed in California at the outset of an action
which, although commenced in a sister state, concerns property located
in California and if litigated in California would justify the recordation of
a notice of pendency. The Note first reviews the development of lis
pendens law in California and the territorial restrictions on the operation
of lis pendens under the common law doctrine. The Note then considers
the current California lis pendens statutes to determine whether the use
of lis pendens in extraterritorial actions impermissibly intrudes upon the
territorial sovereignty of California or conflicts with the policies and interests served by the lis pendens statutes. Finally, the Note analyzes
whether the use of lis pendens in connection with extraterritorial actions
meets statutory requirements. The Note concludes that the use of lis
pendens in extraterritorial actions that affect California property is a desirable extension of the lis pendens procedure, consistent with the purposes and requirements of California law.
Territorial Restrictions on Lis Pendens
Lis pendens is an ancient judicial principle common to law and equity. 17 No actual notice or recordation of a notice is necessary to invoke
the common law lis pendens doctrine; constructive notice is deemed to
arise automatically with the initiation of an action concerning property.18
15. One commentator was unsatisfied with the absence of a mechanism to prevent the
transfer of property to innocent persons during the pendency of nonsitus actions. He remained
reluctant, however, to invoke the doctrine of ]is pendens to insure the binding effect of a foreign court decree. See Currie, supra note 13, at 664-65 & n.161.
16. Under general conflict of laws principles, a forum court applies the law of the forum
to all procedural matters and the law of the situs to substantive matters concerning title to real
property. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 122, 130 (1971); Ailes,

Substance and Procedurein the Conflict of Laws, 39 MICH. L. REv. 392, 392 (1941). Although
a lis pendens entails both substantive and procedural law, the substantive aspects are thought
to predominate. 2 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE %3.05[l] (2d ed. 1984); see also
FED. R. Civ. P. 64 advisory committee note ("No rule concerning lis pendens is stated, for this
would appear to be a matter of substantive law affecting state laws of property."); L. SIMES,
IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING BY LEGISLATION 114, 118 (1960) ("The question whether
the rule is one of 'property' or of 'procedure,' has been often discussed [but] [p]erhaps all that
can be said is that it is a principle of procedure which is superimposed upon the ordinary rule
of property.") Thus, if lis pendens is deemed appropriate for use in extraterritorial actions,
California lis pendens law will apply when California property is involved.

17. See generally 54 C.J.S. Lis Pendens § 1 (1948) ("[The doctrine's] origin is difficult to
...); L. SIMES, supra
determine. . . and it was common to courts both at law and equity.
note 16, at 114-15 (history of the lis pendens doctrine).
18. See MacDermot v. Hayes, 175 Cal. 95, 109-10, 170 P. 616, 621 (1917); Sampson v.
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Because of the doctrine's judicial origins and the potential hardship
that ensues from constructive, rather than actual, notice, the application
of the judicial doctrine of lis pendens 19 was strictly limited to the jurisdictional territory of the court in which the action giving rise to the lis
pendens was being litigated. 20 This limitation was manifested in two
ways. First, only those persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court were deemed to have constructive notice. 2 1 Second, a lis pendens
was valid only if the court had jurisdiction over the property, the parties,
and the cause of action. 22 If these common law restrictions apply to California's statutory lis pendens, then litigants in sister-state actions affecting California property may not resort to the California lis pendens
provisions. This section examines the limitations on the judicial doctrine
of lis pendens and the development of lis pendens law in California.
Rationale for the Limitations on the Judicial Doctrine of Lis Pendens
The first limitation, restricting constructive notice to persons within
the court's jurisdiction, was based upon the assumption that "legal proceedings, during their continuance, [were] publicly known throughout
the realm. ''23 All persons within the court's jurisdiction were deemed to
have constructive notice of a judicial proceeding from the time the action
was initiated. 24 No recordation was necessary to effectuate the lis
pendens doctrine. 25 Consequently, prospective purchasers and encumbrancers of property were compelled to examine court dockets and other
records for information on pending litigation that could affect that propOhleyer, 22 Cal. 200, 210-11 (1863). See generally 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.11,
at 569-70 (A. Casner ed. 1952) (action affecting land is, to all, implied notice of the claim).
19. The terms "judicial doctrine of lis pendens" and "common law doctrine of lis
pendens" will be used interchangeably throughout this Note.
20. See 51 AM. JUR. 2D Lis Pendens §§ 9, 30 (1970); 54 C.J.S. Lis Pendens §§ 4, 40
(1948).
21. See, e.g., Carr v. Lewis Coal Co., 96 Mo. 149, 156, 8 S.W. 907, 909 (1888).
22. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. McGraw, 85 W. Va. 298, 321, 101 S.E. 474, 483 (1919);
Ludvik v. James S. Jackson Co., 635 P.2d 1135, 1141 (Wyo. 1981). In some jurisdictions, this
common law rule prevented proceedings of a state court in one county from having lis pendens
effect on tracts of land located in an adjoining county. Orton v. Citizens State Bank, 144 Okla.
192, 197-99, 291 P. 15, 20-21 (1930). However, actions brought in federal district and circuit
courts or state circuit courts could give rise to ls pendens notice affecting property within their
greater territorial jurisdiction. See Atlas Ry. Supply Co. v. Lake & River Ry., 134 F. 503, 505
(C.C.N.D. Ohio 1905); Majors v. Cowell, 51 Cal. 478, 482-85 (1876); Stewart v. Wheeling &
L.E. Ry. Co., 53 Ohio 151, 164-67, 41 N.E. 247, 251 (1895).
23. Carr v. Lewis Coal Co., 96 Mo. at 156, 8 S.W. at 909 (emphasis in original).
24. See Carr v. Lewis Coal Co., 96 Mo. at 156, 8 S.W. at 909; Stewart v. Wheeling &
L.E. Ry. Co., 53 Ohio at 165, 41 N.E. at 250; First Nat'l Bank v. McGraw, 85 W. Va. at 32022, 101 S.E. at 483-84.
25. See Konold, Lis Pendens-A Time for Reform?, 1 CAL. REAL PROP. J. 1, 1 (Fall
1983) (citing J. BENNET, Lis PENDENS 446 (1887)).
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erty.2 6 The supposition of public knowledge placed a substantial burden
of investigation on prospective transferees of property interests. 27 Without a restriction on the territorial scope of the doctrine, this burden, already considered "sufficiently odious and oppressive, '28 would have
been magnified unreasonably.
The second limitation, that the court must have jurisdiction over the
property, was based on the principle that a court's jurisdiction is limited
to the sovereign state from which it derives its power. Carrv. Lewis Coal
Co.29 illustrates the impact of this principle. In Carr, the Supreme Court
of Missouri upheld a pendente lite conveyance of a tugboat absent an
indication that the tug was located in the state and thus under the court's
jurisdiction either at the time the action was pending or at the time the
decree issued. The Missouri court articulated the common law principles
on which its decision relied:
As a general rule,. . in order directly to subject particular property
to the judgment or decree of any court, the suit brought for that purpose must be brought where the thing is .

. .

. But a lis pendens

should not have any force or operation beyond the boundaries of the
state where the suit is pending. To thus extend its operation would
certainly be giving the judgments and decrees of courts an extra-territorial effect--one in violation of the familiar maxim:

. .

. "No sover-

eignty can extend its process beyond its territorial'30limits, to subject
either persons or property to its judicial decisions."
Later cases, usually without discussion, have imposed the requirement that the property be within the court's jurisdiction. 3 1 This requirement was recently applied in Ludvik v. James S. Jackson Co.32 In
Ludvik, the Wyoming Supreme Court invalidated a notice of lis pendens
filed in conjunction with an action in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Indiana. The validity of the lis pendens was
raised in a state court action concerning the priority that an assignment
of a purchase contract for land in Wyoming, ordered by the Indiana federal court, would have over a pendente lite conveyance of the property to
33
a third person.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Carr v. Lewis Coal Co., 96 Mo. at 158, 8 S.W. at 910.
29. 96 Mo. 149, 8 S.W. 907 (1888).
30. Id. at 155-56, 8 S.W. at 909 (citations omitted). The Missouri court's opinion is
unique in its presentation of a rationale for the requirement of jurisdiction over the res. The
rationale is consistent with the view that lis pendens is the "jurisdiction, power, or control
which a court acquires over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action,
and until final judgment therein." Astle, An Analysis of the Evolution of Oklahoma Real Property Law Relating to Lis Pendens and Judgment Liens, 32 OKLA. L. REv. 812, 812 (1979).

31.
32.
33.
fending

See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. McGraw, 85 W. Va. 298, 321, 101 S.E. 474, 483 (1919).
635 P.2d 1135 (Wyo. 1981).
Ludvik involved a dispute over a contract for the acquisition of property by the departnership, Horseshoe Creek Limited. The acquisition contract secured a construc-
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The Wyoming Supreme Court invalidated the extraterritorial lis

pendens on three grounds. First, noting that the Wyoming lis pendens
statute codified the common law lis pendens doctrine, 34 the court held

that "the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana did not have jurisdiction over the real property in the State of Wyoming, and under the common-law doctrine of lis pendens no priority
could attach to the action of that court by virtue of the pending

action."

35

36
Second, the court observed that the Wyoming lis pendens statute
permitted but did not require recordation of a notice of lis pendens for
validity. The court concluded that the state lis pendens provision obviously was "designed to permit a notice of lis pendens within the State of
Wyoming with respect to property located in the state in relation to an
action brought in another county or in the United States District Court

for the District of Wyoming," but was not intended to apply to actions in
37
other jurisdictions.
Finally, the court emphasized that "the court of one state has no
power to directly affect title to land located wholly within the borders of
tion contract between Horseshoe and the James S. Jackson Company. When the construction
contract was breached by Horseshoe, the Jackson Company attempted to bring an action in
Platte County, Wyoming, where the property was located. The action was dismissed by the
Wyoming state district court, apparently for lack of jurisdiction, whereupon the Jackson Company initiated the federal action in Indiana and filed the lis pendens. See Ludvik v. James S.
Jackson Co., 635 P.2d at 1151 (Raper, J., dissenting). During the federal court action, Horseshoe assigned the acquisition contract to a third party, Ludvik. The federal court found in
favor of the Jackson Company; thereafter Ludvik filed an action to quiet title in a Wyoming
state court. The validity of the lis pendens filed in the federal action, and Ludvik's status as a
pendente lite purchaser, were considered on appeal. Id. at 1140-41.
34. Id. at 1140. The Wyoming statute provides as follows: "When a summons has been
served or publication made, the action is pending so as to charge third persons with notice of
its pendency, and while pending no interest can be acquired by third persons in the subject
matter thereof as against the plaintiff's title." Wyo. STAT. § 1-6-106 (1977).
35. Ludvik, 635 P.2d at 1140-41.
36. WYO. STAT. § 1-6-108 (1977) provides:
In an action in a state court or in a United States district court affecting the title or
right of possession of real property, or in an action between husband and wife, the
plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint and the defendant at the time of filing his
pleading when affirmative relief is claimed or at any time afterward, may file in the
office of the county clerk in which the property is situated a notice of pendency of the
action containing the names of the parties, the object of the action or defense and a
description of the property in that county affected thereby. From the time of filing
the notice a subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer of the property shall have constructive notice of the pendency of the action.
The Wyoming court declined to address the question of whether the federal court action in
Indiana was an action "affecting the title or right of possession of real property" as required by
the Wyoming lis pendens statute. Ludvik, 635 P.2d at 1142.
37. Ludvik, 635 P.2d at 1141. The Wyoming court did not discuss or provide support for
this conclusion.
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another" 38 and concluded that "[t]he benefit of that proposition effectively would be denied to owners of real property in Wyoming if by the
filing of a notice of lis pendens relating to an action pending in another
jurisdiction the property would be bound by the result of any judgment
in the foreign court."'39 The Wyoming court thus affirmed the vitality of
the common law territorial jurisdiction requirement under modem Wyoming law.
Both Ludvik and Carr reflect the concern that a lis pendens, by directly affecting property outside the forum state, may improperly extend
the jurisdiction of the forum court. 4° These opinions differ, however, in
the interests they safeguard by this restriction. Although the court in
Carr sought to protect unwary purchasers, 4 1 the Ludvik court sought to
alleviate the burden that notice of lis pendens placed on Wyoming property owners. 42 This difference may arise only because in Carr the lis
pendens involved personal property, 4 3 while in Ludvik the lis pendens

concerned real property. However, it also may reflect the practical
change in the operation of lis pendens under modem law. 44 At the time
38. Id. (quoting Kane v. Kane, 577 P.2d 172, 175 (1978)).
39. Ludvik, 635 P.2d at 1141. The Wyoming Supreme Court did acknowledge, however,
that the federal court acted within its jurisdictional powers:
[T]his court [has] recognized that a court of equity having authority to act upon the
person may indirectly act upon real estate located in another state through the coercive power it has over the person over whom it has jurisdiction. We, therefore, do
not deny the power of the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Indiana to order the assignment by Horseshoe Creek Limited [to the James S. Jackson Company].
Id.
40. See supra notes 30, 39 & accompanying text. In this Note the term "forum court"
refers to the court adjudicating the action concerning property; "extraterritorial court" refers
to a court outside the territorial boundaries of California; and "situs court" refers to a court
with territorial jurisdiction over the affected property.
41. Carr v. Lewis Coal Co., 96 Mo. at 157-58, 8 S.W. at 910.
[The doctrine of lis pendens] is a very harsh presumption and rule which force the
citizens, within the same state, to take notice, at their peril, of all matters being adjudicated within its borders . . . .But to say its operation shall be extended to every
portion of the United States would be a very startling extension of a rule already
sufficiently odious and oppressive.
Id. (emphasis added).
42. See supra note 39 & accompanying text.
43. The court in Carrv. Lewis Coal Co. expressed concern about applying the lis pendens
doctrine to movable personalty with "no history or ear-marks of litigious strife about it." 96
Mo. at 157, 8 S.W. at 910. The court stated "[this] would be carrying the doctrine of lis
pendens. . . to a most extraordinary and pernicious length." Id.
44. The recordation required by statute and the heavy reliance on state recording systems
in the use of title insurance in modem property transactions have altered the character of lis
pendens from a post judgment device to enforce the court's decree to a prejudgment device
that prevents transfers by providing record notice and creating a cloud on title. See Allied E.
Fin. v. Goheen Enters., 265 Cal. App. 2d 131, 134, 71 Cal. Rptr. 126, 127-28 (1968) (lis
pendens restricts marketability of land); Note, After Malcolm v. Superior Court and Peery v.
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of the Carr decision, the existence of a lis pendens was detrimental to the
unwary purchaser of property. A lis pendens today, however, effectively
prevents the property owner from selling or transferring the property because of the cloud on title created by the recorded notice.
These common law territorial restrictions on lis pendens nevertheless did not alleviate the hardship that an unrecorded constructive notice
imposed on prospective purchasers and encumbrancers. In response,
many states enacted statutes requiring that notice of the pending action
be filed with the county recorder to invoke the operation of the lis
45
pendens doctrine.
The Development of the Lis Pendens Doctrine in California
Lis pendens in California developed almost exclusively as a creature
of statute. California enacted its first lis pendens statute as part of the
Practice Act in 1851, just two years after statehood. 46 The California
courts interpreted the lis pendens provisions of the Practice Act as qualifications, but not abrogations, of the common law doctrine of lis
47
pendens.
In 1872 the California legislature replaced the Practice Act with the
predecessors to the present code provisions. 4 8 The original statutory
scheme substantially resembled current section 409(a) of the California
Code of Civil Procedure. 49 Both the original and current statute exSuperior Court: A Due ProcessAnalysis of CaliforniaLis Pendens, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 909, 910
(1982); see also Howden-Goetzl v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. App. 3d 135, 138, 86 Cal. Rptr. 323,
326 (1970) ("An attachment of real property and a notice of lis pendens are similar in
purpose.").
45. See Sampson v. Ohleyer, 22 Cal. 200, 210 (1863); see also Konold, supra note 25, at
1.
46. California Practice Act § 27, 1851 Cal. Stat. 54, which provided that:
In an action affecting the title to real property, the plaintiff at the time of filing the
complaint, or at any time afterwards, may file with the Recorder of the county in
which the property is situated, a notice of the pendency of the action, containing the
names of the parties, the object of the action, and a description of the property in that
county affected thereby. From the time of filing only, shall the pendency of the action be constructive notice to a purchaser or incumbrancer of the property affected
thereby.
The essential language of this provision has not changed significantly. See supra note 5.
47. In Richardson v. White, 18 Cal. 102 (1861), the California Supreme Court stated that
"our statute qualifies the common law doctrine in reference to purchases pendente lite." Id. at
106 (citations omitted). "We consider our statute, not as giving new rights to the plaintiff, but
as a limitation upon the rights which he had before." Id. at 107. Two years later, the California Supreme Court reemphasized that, other than the requirement of filing, "[i]n no other
respect are the rules of law relating to this subject changed by the statute." Sampson v.
Ohleyer, 22 Cal. 200, 210 (1863).
48. Act of Mar. 2, 1872, 1871-1872 Cal. Stat. 189.
49. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 409(a) (West Supp. 1984). Since 1873, the statute has
been significantly amended twice. In 1959 the legislature added an authorization for use by
federal district courts, Act of May 15, 1959, 1959 Cal. Stat. 2306. In 1981 the legislature
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50
pressly apply to actions affecting the right of possession.
The California Supreme Court interpreted the new Code as an abrogation of the common law lis pendens doctrine, although the statute contained no express repudiation.5 1 Early decisions under the Code broadly
"abolish" and "exclude" the common law doctrine.5 2 These cases focused, however, on the particular requirements for filing, 53 the type of
property involved, 5 4 and the character of the underlying action 5 5-factors included in the express language of the statute.5 6 Thus, the court's

added subsections (b) and (c), Act of Sept. 28, 1981, 1981 Cal. Stat. 3400. Minor amendments
were also made in 1980, extending lis pendens availability to cross-actions, Act of June 12,
1980, 1980 Cal. Stat. 361-62, and in 1983, excepting eminent domain proceedings which have
separate notice requirements, Act of June 14, 1983, 1983 Cal. Legis. Serv. 657 (West).
50. The Practice Act applied to "actions affecting the title of real property." CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE §§ 409-409.8 (West 1972 & Supp. 1983). In 1871 the California Legislature extended the Act to "actions affecting the title to real property or the right to the possession of
real property." 1871-1872 Cal. Stat. 189. The amended Act was replaced shortly thereafter by
the new Code, which applied to actions generally "affecting real property." CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 409 (Crocker 1872). Code amendments enacted in 1874 narrowed the Act's application to actions "affecting the title or right of possession of real property." See CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 409 comments and commissioner's notes (west 1972).
51. In Page v. W.W. Chase Co., 145 Cal. 578, 79 P. 278 (1904) (action to quiet title), the
California Supreme Court found no constructive notice because no notice of pendency had
been filed as required by statute. The court declared that "[t]he rule of the common law that a
purchaser pendente lite of the subject of the controversy took as a volunteer or intruder and in
subordination to the judgment thereafter rendered in the action is not in force in this state."
Id. at 581, 79 P. at 279. This decision, however, could be read merely to modify, rather than to
abolish, the common law doctrine by the addition of the filing requirement, because the failure
to record a notice of pendency was the sole issue affecting the existence and validity of the lis
pendens in dispute. Later decisions, however, interpreted the statute to abolish the common
law rule. In MacDermot v. Hayes, 175 Cal. 95, 170 P. 616 (1917), the California Supreme
Court considered whether the lis pendens doctrine encompassed personal property. The court
concluded that personal property was not subject to a lis pendens because § 1908 of the Code
of Civil Procedure excluded "the common-law doctrine that the pendency of an action is itself
constructive notice to all." Id. at 110, 170 P. at 622. The court then interpreted § 1908 "to
abolish the common-law rule, except in so far as it is preserved by section 409 of the Code of
Civil Procedure," which expressly applied only to actions concerning real property. Id. In
Bernhard v. Wall, 184 Cal. 612, 194 P. 1040 (1921), the California court examined the statutory requirement that the underlying action affect title or right of possession of real property:
"[S]ection 409 is exclusive. . . . [An action of any other character than is there provided for
does not constitute constructive notice of its pendency." Id. at 630, 194 P. at 1048.
52. Bernhard v. Wall, 184 Cal. at 630, 194 P. at 1048; MacDermot v. Hayes, 175 Cal. at
110, 170 P. at 622; Page v. W.W. Chase Co., 145 Cal. at 581, 79 P. at 278.
53. Page v. W.W. Chase Co., 145 Cal. at 581-82, 79 P. at 279.
54. MacDermot v. Hayes, 175 Cal. at 108-10, 170 P. at 621-22.
55. Bernhard v. Wall, 184 Cal. at 630, 194 P. at 1048.
56. See supra note 5. Under the common law doctrine, a lis pendens is effective if:
(1) the property is of a character subject to the rule of lis pendens; (2) the property is sufficiently described in the pleadings; (3) the litigation affects the property by its outcome; and
(4) the court has acquired jurisdiction over both the persons and the property. Only the first
three requirements have been incorporated into the California lis pendens statutes. CAL. CiV.
PROC. CODE § 409(a) (west Supp. 1985).
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conclusion that the statute abrogated the common law doctrine may
merely mean that contradictory or analogous requirements of the common law doctrine must yield to the statute. It is unclear whether the
abrogation of the common law doctrine included the common law requirement that the property subject to the lis pendens lie within the
court's territorial jurisdiction. 57 This question has not been considered
by the California courts.
Even if the common law lis pendens doctrine is abolished in California, the territorial requirement nonetheless may remain as an essential
element of jurisdiction. 5 8 If the common law doctrine survives, then the
degree of change in the doctrine's operation under the lis pendens statutes justifies a fresh analysis of the territorial requirement under current
law. 59 The vitality of the territorial requirement will now be evaluated
by examining the lis pendens statutes and the modern operation and effect of lis pendens.
Does a Lis Pendens Violate Territorial Jurisdiction?
The limitation on a court's ability to affect land outside its territorial
jurisdiction "is an ancient one and represents the view when the common
law of England quite naturally looked with distrust upon any effort of a
foreign power to dictate with respect to English land ....
,,60 Although
the rule was international in its origins, 6 1 the concept of state sovereignty
and the "anxious fear that the State may be deprived of control over its
own land"' 62 perpetuated the rule, so that today a court of one state may
57. In California the statutes apparently have eliminated the common law limitation on
the scope of notice, as well as its underlying rationale. A notice of lis pendens must be recorded before it operates to provide constructive notice. Recordation, together with the extensive use of title insurance in real estate transactions, provides a practical means of giving actual
notice to any person interested in a particular property, alleviating much of the hardship the
common law doctrine placed on prospective purchasers and encumbrancers.
58. If a notice of lis pendens constitutes a direct effect on property as suggested by the
court in Ludvik, 635 P.2d 1135 (Wyo. 1981), then the use of lis pendens in an extraterritorial
action may exceed the foreign court's territorial jurisdiction.
59. In particular, the operation of lis pendens has changed because of the types of actions
that now qualify for lis pendens protection, see supra notes 7-10 & accompanying text, and the
change in lis pendens to a prejudgment device due to recordation and title insurance practice.
The concerns raised by the Carr court, see supra note 41 & accompanying text, regarding
burdens on prospective purchasers and encumbrancers, largely have been alleviated by recordation. The new burdens on land owners, the effect of statutes, and possible complications in
the recordation system-concerns voiced by the court in Ludvik-must be considered with
regard to California law.
60. Bentley, Equity Decrees in Sister States, 8 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 9 (1934).
61. See id.; see also Hancock, supra note 13, at 1304 n.28 (quoting J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 373 (lst ed. 1834)).
62. Currie, supra note 13, at 628 (quoting Barbour, The Extra-TerritorialEffect of the
Equitable Decree, 17 MICH. L. REV. 527, 547 (1919)).
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not create, transfer, or vest title to land located in another state. 63 The
question thus arises whether the effect of a recorded notice of lis pendens,
filed in California in relation to an extraterritorial action that indirectly
concerns realty, violates the restrictions of territorial sovereignty.
In Ludvik v. James S. Jackson Co.," the Wyoming Supreme Court
expressed concern that a lis pendens would bind property to any judgment rendered by a foreign court, thereby circumventing the principle
that the court of one state cannot directly affect title to land located in
another state.6 5 In Ludvik, the federal district court ordered the Horseshoe partnership to assign a contract to acquire land to the Jackson Company. Horseshoe, however, had assigned the contract to Ludvik after the
federal court action commenced, but before the assignment had been ordered by the federal court. When Horseshoe failed to comply with the
federal court order, the United States Marshall for the Northern District
of Indiana executed the assignment. 66 The Wyoming Supreme Court invalidated the lis pendens and gave Ludvik priority to the assignment on
the ground that giving an assignment priority from the date a notice of lis
pendens is filed effectively allows the judgment to divest the interests of
67
one party and to vest the interest of another.
The Wyoming Supreme Court's conclusion appears to be based on
the assumption that the priority given the assignment ordered by the federal district courts through a lis pendens operates in a manner equivalent
to the vesting or divesting of property interests through the judgment.68
Upon examination, this assumption is unsatisfying. The assignment
made by the United States Marshall upon the federal court's order would
not have transferred rights in the property any sooner by virtue of the lis
pendens. Even if the lis pendens were valid, Horseshoe would have re63. Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1909); Redwood Inv. Co. v. Exley, 64 Cal. App.
455, 459, 221 P. 973, 975 (1923).
64. 635 P.2d 1135 (Wyo. 1981).
65. Id. at 1141. The issue before the court was whether the assignment of the land acquisition contract to the Jackson Company by order of the federal district court preceded the
assignment of the contract by the Horseshoe partnership to Ludvik. Id. at 1140. The assignment to Ludvik occurred after the action in the district court was initiated and the lis pendens
was filed, but before the actual order of the court. Id. at 1139. If the lis pendens filed under
authority of the Wyoming statute in conjunction with the action in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Indiana was found valid, the court-ordered assignment
would have priority over the assignment to Ludvik. Id. at 1140-42.
66. Id. at 1141. Under Rule 70 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a federal court
may order persons appointed by the court to execute specific acts if a party so directed fails to
comply. FED. R. Civ. P. 70.
67. Ludvik, 635 P.2d at 1141. Thus, an assignment under Rule 70 is effective only from
its date of assignment.
68. See id. at 1141. The court mistakenly understood the preclusive effect of a lis pendens
to give retroactive effect to the assignment itself, violating the rule that "for the United States
District Court to enter judgment divesting the title of any party and vesting it in others, the
property has to be within the district." Id.
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mained the actual owner of the property until the assignment was made.
Any priority that the court-ordered assignment would have over the
pendente lite assignment to Ludvik would derive from constructive notice of the action, not from the retroactivity of the assignment ordered by
the federal court. The court failed to show that the priority obtained
through the protection of an effective lis pendens in such an extraterritorial action is an effect on title, equivalent to the direct vesting or divesting
69
of title prohibited by the territorial jurisdictional doctrine.
In California, a notice of pendency has been held to be a conveyance
for purposes of the California recording statutes, so that constructive notice arises upon recordation. 70 A conveyance is defined as an instrument
by which "an estate or interest in real property is created, aliened, mortgaged, or encumbered, or by which the title to any real property may be
affected." 7' If a notice of lis pendens creates or alienates property interests as set forth in the definition, then the use of lis pendens in an extraterritorial action probably violates territorial restrictions on jurisdiction.
Although a notice of pendency does not mortgage or alienate interests in
property, create or vest title or other interests in realty, 72 or create a lien
69. The Wyoming court's actual basis for rejecting the validity of the court-ordered assignment was that the ordered assignment was improper. According to the compromise and
settlement agreement upon which the United States District Court's final decree was based, the
Jackson Company was entitled to a security interest in the land acquisition contract. In other
words, the order and decree should have given the Jackson Company an equitable mortgage
against the property rather than an assignment to the contract of sale. Id. at 1142-43. The
Wyoming Supreme Court thus used the invalidation of the lis
pendens as an expeditious mechanism to do indirectly what it lacked direct authority to do: invalidate a federal court decision.
Because this action of the court rests on a questionable analysis, it is not convincing authority
for the conclusion that a lis pendens violates the limits of territorial jurisdiction by enabling an
extraterritorial decree directly to vest or to divest title to property.
In addition to the enhancing effect on judgments claimed by the Wyoming Supreme Court
in Ludvik, a lis pendens by its recordation may affect property directly in a manner that violates the territorial restrictions against direct vesting or divesting of title.
70. Putnam Sand & Gravel Co. v. Albers, 14 Cal. App. 3d 722, 725, 92 Cal. Rptr. 636,
638 (1971). The recording act provides that "[e]very conveyance of real property . . . recorded as prescribed by law . . . is constructive notice of the contents thereof." In Putnam
Sand the court ruled that under the recording act the notice of lis pendens was a conveyance
and thus effective to provide notice. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1213 (West 1982). Note that CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 27280(a) (West Supp. 1984) also provides that "[any instrument or judgment
affecting the title to or possession of real property may be recorded pursuant to this chapter."
The recordation of a notice of lis pendens could be authorized under this provision without
defining a lis pendens as a conveyance. Government Code § 27280 provides for neither constructive notice by recordation, as does Civil Code § 1213, nor for the notice effect of a lis
pendens, as does Civil Procedure Code § 409(a). The Government Code also encompasses
instruments that affect title to or right to possession of property as does the lis pendens statute,
whereas the Civil Code definition of a conveyance only contemplates effects on title. See infra
note 71 & accompanying text.
71. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1215 (West 1982).
72. See Contini v. Western Title Ins. Co., 40 Cal. App. 3d 536, 542, 115 Cal. Rptr. 257,
260 (1974) (notice of lis pendens does not impart notice of the judgment); Brownlee v. Vang,
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on the subject property, 73 it may affect interests in realty by creating a
cloud on title, thus impairing the marketability of the property. 74 This
effect on marketability is a result not of the notice of pendency alone but
of the existence of the underlying action. 75 Thus, a lis pendens merely
recordation the priority of any interests determined
establishes through
76
by the litigation.
A notice of lis pendens has also been characterized as a provisional
remedy, 77 similar in purpose to a writ of attachment. 78 Although attachment and lis pendens are remedies that promote the security of judgments, attachment constitutes a clear assertion of the court's control over
the disposition of property during and after the litigation. 7 9 In contrast,
a notice of lis pendens does not involve judicial control over the property. 80 Thus, while attachment of property can, in some circumstances,
206 Cal. App. 2d 814, 816-17, 24 Cal. Rptr. 158, 159-60 (1962) (notice is supplemental and
subject to proceedings in the main action); see also 51 AM. JUR. 2D Lis Pendens § 31 (1962) (lis
pendens is inoperative absent a valid judgment); L. SIMES, MODEL TITLE STANDARDS 92-93
(1960) ("A notice of pendency. . . is not a source of substantive rights.").
73. McKenzie County v. Casady, 55 N.D. 475, 484, 214 N.W. 461, 465 (1927); see also
Atlas, Inc. v. United States, 459 F. Supp. 1000, 1004 (D.N.D. 1978) (lis pendens does not
create a choate interest to give priority over an unrecorded tax lien).
74. See Allied E. Fin. v. Goheen Enters., 265 Cal. App. 2d 131, 134, 71 Cal. Rptr. 126,
127-28 (1968); see also R. HERTZBERG & T. REGELE, CALIFORNIA Lis PENDENS PRACTICE
14-16 (1983) (due process analysis of lispendens); Note, supra note 44, at 923-26 (lis pendens
as a deprivation of property rights).
75. See L. SIMEs, supra note 72, at 92-93 (comment to proposed standard 22.2, that "[a]n
unreleased notice of the pendency of proceedings does not impair marketability after the noticed proceedings have terminated" because "[a] notice of the pending proceeding is not a
source of substantive rights").
76. See Stagen v. Stewart-West Coast Title Co., 149 Cal. App. 3d 114, 122-23, 196 Cal.
Rptr. 732, 737 (1983); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 409 (West Supp. 1984); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1213 (West 1982). The constitutionality of the lis pendens procedure in California has been
challenged on due process grounds; however, no court has found a deprivation of a property
interest sufficient to constitute a due process violation. See Empfield v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.
App. 3d 105, 108, 108 Cal. Rptr. 375, 377 (1973) (dicta) (criticized in Konold, supra note 25,
at 5); see also Note, supra note 44, at 925-26 & n.132.
77. Coppinger v. Superior Court, 134 Cal. App. 3d 883, 888-89, 185 Cal. Rptr. 24, 28
(1982).
78. Howden-Goetzl v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. App. 3d 135, 138, 86 Cal. Rptr. 323, 326
(1970). See generally 7 C.J.S. Attachment § 65 (1980). "Since an attachment is in the nature
of a proceeding in rem, in order that a court may have jurisdiction to attach property, it is
indispensable that [the] property. . . be present, actually or constructively, within the territorial limits over which the court may exercise its power." Id. (footnotes omitted). An attachment of property is a direct exercise of a court's jurisdiction and thus can occur only when the
attached property is within the court's jurisdiction.
79. Attachment is obtained by a formal procedure, reviewed by an officer of the court,
that requires notice and an opportunity to be heard to meet due process standards, and is
executed by a writ empowering the sheriff to take the specified property into the court's "custody." See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 482.010-484.120 (West 1979 & Supp. 1984).
80. A lis pendens does not require judicial review or approval. See CAL. CIv. PROC.
CODE § 409 (West Supp. 1984). A lis pendens is not a "process" in the sense of "abuse of
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over an action, 8 1 a lis pendens can never be
establish a court's jurisdiction
82
a basis for jurisdiction.
In sum, the common law territorial restriction has not been expressly incorporated in California lis pendens law. Moreover, the concerns underlying the common law territorial restriction have been
addressed in California by the statutory recording requirement and limited application of lis pendens to real property. Finally, a recorded notice of pendency does not create, transfer, or vest title to or interests in
realty. Thus, the notice of pendency recorded in relation to an extraterritorial action that indirectly affects real property does not affect title in a
manner that violates the territorial sovereignty of the situs state.
The Use of Lis Pendens in Extraterritorial Actions
The preceding section shows that neither the common law doctrine
nor the territorial sovereignty restriction necessarily prevents the plaintiff
from filing a notice of pendency in California in relation to an action
commenced outside of California. We have seen that the common law
territorial restriction has not been expressly applied to California lis
pendens law by statute or case law. We have also seen that the concerns
underlying the common law territorial restriction have been ameliorated
in California by the statutory recording requirement and limited application of lis pendens to real property. Finally, the previous section demonstrates that a recorded lis pendens does not in itself affect title so as to
violate concepts of territorial sovereignty. The propriety of extraterritorial lis pendens, however, also requires the sanction of the applicable lis
pendens statutes. Ir. this section of the Note the statutory language and
underlying policy of section 409 of the California Code of Civil Procedure are examined. Then the Note analyzes the impact on the viability
of extraterritorial lis pendens due to the California requirement that the
action affect the title to, or the right to possess, real property.
process." Woodcourt II Ltd. v. McDonald Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 245, 251-52, 173 Cal. Rptr.
836, 840 (1981). A lispendens has been defined as "the jurisdiction, power or control which a
court acquires over property involved in a suit." 54 C.J.S. Lis Pendens § 1, at 570 (1948).
However, this characterization has been criticized: "Lis Pendens is often spoken of as the
'power of jurisdiction which a court has over a property during the pendency of actions affecting it' . . . but that way of putting the matter overlooks the fact that if a court really had any
power or jurisdiction over the property, parties entirely apart, Lis Pendens would be beside the
point." L. SIMES, supra note 16, at 116 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original); see also
Laurence, supra note 4, at 350-55. A lis pendens is distinguishable from an attachment or
garnishment in three ways: (1) with a lis pendens, no disposition or deprivation occurs; (2) no
lien is created by a lis pendens (whereas a substantial interest is created upon attachment
which becomes a lien with judgment); and (3) the use of lis pendens is restricted to actions
affecting property. Id.
81. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
82. See 54 C.J.S. Lis Pendens § 5 (1948) (jurisdiction by the court is a prerequisite to lis
pendens, and filing a notice of lis pendens does not confer jurisdiction).
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Statutory Interpretation
A fundamental tenet of statutory interpretation is that if the meaning and legislative intent of a statute are clear, and its language unambiguous, then the statute should not be interpreted to conflict with its clear
meaning solely on policy grounds. 83 If, however, neither the statutory
language nor legislative intent pertains to a particular situation, then the
operation of the statute may be determined by reference to broader policy objectives. 84 These rules will now be applied in interpreting whether
section 409 encompasses the use of lis pendens in connection with action
commenced in sister states.
Language of the Statutory Provisions
Section 409 does not expressly prohibit the filing of a notice of lis
pendens based on extraterritorial actions that concern California property. Some of the statutory language suggests, however, that section 409

may apply only to actions in California courts. Section 409(a) states:
In an action concerning real property or affecting the title or the
right of possession of real property, the plaintiff, at the time of filing
the complaint, and the defendant, at the time of filing a cross-complaint, or at any time afterwards, may record in the office of the recorder of the county in which the property is situated, a notice of the
pendency of the action, containing the names of the parties, and the
object of the action or cross-action, and a description of the property in
that county affected thereby. This section authorizes a notice of an action concerning realpropertypending in any United States district court
to be recorded and indexed in the same manner and in the same place
as herein provided with respect to notices of action pending in courts of
this state. From the time of filing such notice for record only, shall a
purchaser or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby be deemed
to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action as it relates to
the real property and only of its pendency against parties designated by
their real names. 85
The second sentence of section 409(a) is ambiguous: did the legislature intend the phrase "courts of this state" to limit the filing of lis
pendens notices in conjunction with state actions to actions commenced
in California courts, or does the language indicate the appropriate procedure for filing lis pendens notices concerning actions commenced in any
court?
The ambiguity may be resolved by interpreting the legislative intent
manifest in the history of the statute. In 195986 the California legislature
83.

Davis v. Hart, 123 Cal. 384, 387, 55 P. 1060, 1061 (1899); Rumetsche v. Davis, 47

Cal. App. 512, 515, 190 P. 1075, 1076 (1920).
84. B. CURRIE, Purchase-MoneyMortgages and State Lines: A Study in Conflict ofLaws
Method, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 376, 378 (1963).
85. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 409(a) (West 1973) (emphasis added).

86.

1959 Cal. Stat. 2306; see also Allied E. Fin. v. Goheen Enters., 265 Cal. App. 2d 131,
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amended section 409(a) by adding the language in question. The legislature acted in response to the enactment of a federal statute 87 designed to
provide federal litigants with the same lis pendens protections available
to litigants in state court actions.8 8 The California legislature amended
section 409 to conform with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1964 by
expressly authorizing the filing of lis pendens notices in relation to fed89
eral court actions.

132-33, 71 Cal. Rptr. 126, 127 (1968) (history of the lis pendens statute in California). Until
the amendment was added, California followed the states which held that a notice of lis
pendens filed in relation to an action in federal court was not governed by the state statute. See
51 AM. JUR. 2D Lis Pendens § 8 (1970). In Majors v. Cowell, 51 Cal. 478 (1876), the California Supreme Court held that the state lis pendens statute constituted a rule of procedure which
did not bind the federal court, absent an express provision in the federal rules or statutes. Id.
at 482-83. The drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, viewed lis pendens
as a substantive rule of law concerning property within a state and therefore did not include a
lis pendens provision in the Federal Rules. See FED. R. Civ. P. 64 advisory committee notes;
see also J. MOORE, supra note 16, 3.5[1]; 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2931 (1973). Some federal courts applied the lis pendens law of the state
in which the court was situated even before enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1964. In California,
however, the common law doctrine of lis pendens was used to provide constructive notice in
federal court actions, and no recordation was required. Majors v. Cowell, 51 Cal. 478 (1876).
87. Act of Aug. 20, 1958, 72 Stat. 683 (1958) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1964
(1982)). In 1958 Congress endeavored to remedy the disparity between state court and federal
court actions in states with rules like California's by enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1964 "to provide
that notice of an action . . . with respect to real property, pending before a United States
district court, must be recorded if State law so provides, in order to be considered constructive
notice to others that such action is pending." 2 J. MOORE, supra note 16, q 3.05 [2] n.4 (citing
S. REP. No. 2131, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3654). Section 1964 of title 28 of the United States Code provides:
Where the law of a State requires a notice of an action concerning real property
pending in a court of the State to be registered, recorded, docketed, or indexed in a
particular manner, or in a certain office or county or parish in order to give constructive notice of the action as it relates to the real property, and such law authorizes a
notice of an action concerning realproperty pending in a United States district court
to be registered, recorded, docketed, or indexed in the same manner, or in the same
place, those requirements of the State law must be complied with in order to give
constructive notice of such an action pending in a United States district court as it
relates to real property in such State.
28 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982) (emphasis added).
88. See S. REP. No. 2131, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3654; see also Allied E. Fin. v. Goheen Enters., 265 Cal. App. 2d 131, 133, 71 Cal.
Rptr. 126, 127 (1968) (discussion of intent behind amendment to California statute). Congress
may have also intended § 1964 to provide for a more expansive right of lis pendens than was
available in some jurisdictions. See 2 J. MOORE, supra note 16, 3.05[2] n.4.
89. Senate Report 2131 stated:
[T]he State law must also expressly authorize notice of Federal suits to be registered,
indexed, etc., in the same manner as notices in State courts ....
This latter provision is necessary since Congress cannot properly seek to impose on State officers such
as clerks of courts or registrars of conveyances, the duty of recording or indexing of
Federal notices unless the States open the way and are willing to have their officers
receive such papers.
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This history indicates that the California legislature probably did
not intend the phrase "in courts of this state" 90 to limit lis pendens to
actions located in California. The phrase "in courts of this state" appears to be taken directly from the federal statute, 9 1 perhaps in an attempt to adhere as closely as possible to the language of 28 U.S.C
§ 1964.92 Alternatively, the phrase may simply denote that the federal
courts should follow the lis pendens procedure described for California
courts. Thus, the use of lis pendens by extraterritorial
federal courts
93
does not appear to conflict with the statutory intent.
The statute must be analyzed further to discern the implication that
access to the California lis pendens procedure by extraterritorial federal
courts litigants has for actions commenced in sister-state courts. The
provisions of the California Code of Civil Procedure pertaining to lis
pendens do not explicitly refer to the use of lis pendens in connection
with actions in sister-state courts. 94 Moreover, because of the common
law territorial sovereignty restriction, the legislature may not have contemplated such a use when it drafted these statutes, as sister-state actions
did not support a valid notice of pendency under the common law docS. REP. No. 2131, 85th Cong., 2d Sess 2, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3654, 3655; see 2 J. MOORE, supra note 16, S 3.28.
90. See supra note 5.
91. Compare emphasized portions of 28 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982), supra note 87, with the
second sentence of CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 409(a) (West 1973), supra text accompanying

note 85.
92. See Allied E. Fin. v. Goheen Enters., 265 Cal. App. 2d 131, 133, 71 Cal. Rptr. 126,
127 (1968) (SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT FOR INTERIM 1957-1959 amends the
first sentence of § 409 "in an effort to adhere as closely as possible to the language of the
congressional act."); supra notes 6-10 & accompanying text. Absent an express statutory intent to remove any territorial restriction on other courts regarding lis pendens, the extent to
which the lis pendens constitutes a direct effect on property remains subject to the limitations
of territorial sovereignty. Under the conflict of laws principles of governmental interest analysis, any application of lis
pendens by a foreign court must also meet the statutory requirements
of the situs state. See Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 101 Cal. Rptr. 314
(1972); Hancock, supra note 13, at 1299-1305.
93. "Sister-state" courts are state courts other than California state courts. "Extraterritorial courts" are any court, state or federal, outside the situs jurisdiction.
94. Neither § 409 nor § 1908, which binds successors in interest to the outcome of an
action of which they have actual or constructive notice, mentions sister-state actions. See CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 409, 1908 (West 1973); see supra notes 5, 59. Section 1908(a) provides in
pertinent part:
The effect of a judgment or final order in an action or special proceeding before a
court or judge of this State, or of the United States. . .is, in respect to the matter
directly adjudged, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by
title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding,. . . provided they have notice, actual or constructive, of the pendency of the action or
proceeding.
Id. § 1908(a).
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trine of lis pendens. 95 Arguably, however, the silence of section 409 in
regard to extraterritorial actions does not necessarily preclude such an
application of the statute. An amendment to section 409 was required
before notices of pendency could be filed in federal court actions, 96 thus
indicating that a similar express extension of the statute might be necessary before the statute could apply to sister-state actions. The analogy
between federal proceedings based on diversity jurisdiction and sisterstate actions, 97 however, suggests that the express extension of the statute
to federal court actions may support an implicit extension of the statute
to sister-state court actions. 98
In summary, the language of section 409 neither expressly sanctions
nor prohibits the recordation of a notice of pendency in conjunction with
actions affecting California property brought in federal or sister-state
courts. It appears unlikely that use of the section by litigants in extraterritorial proceedings was contemplated by the legislature when it enacted
95. See, e.g., Carr v. Lewis Coal Co., 96 Mo. 149, 8 S.W. 907 (1888). See generallysupra
text accompanying notes 17-30.
96. See supra note 89.
97. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1944).
98. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1908(a) (West 1983); see supra note 94. Although § 409
may permit a plaintiff to file a notice of ls pendens in a sister-state court action, the language
of § 1908, the operational partner of § 409, binds only pendente lite purchasers and encumbrancers to judgments in proceedings "before a court or judge of this State, or of the United
States" only if provided with actual or constructive notice of the proceedings. Recordation of
a notice of pendency under § 409 in relation to an action in a sister-state court thus may not
bind successors in interest under § 1908. Nevertheless, the notice could bind such transferees
through the fraudulent conveyance statutes, statutory and common law rules regarding bona
fide purchasers, or common law rules of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Thus, while a
notice of pending action in a sister-state court could have effect, such effect would not be based
on traditional lis pendens theory. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1227, 1228, 3439.09 (West 1982).
Under these provisions, an instrument affecting real property made with the intent to defraud
a prior or subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer is void as to purchasers and encumbrancers
in privity with the fraud. A notice of pendency filed under § 409, without the benefit of effect
under § 1908 and in the absence of a common law doctrine of lis pendens, may nonetheless be
relevant in determining a transferee's knowledge or fraudulent intent. See 2 H. MILLER & M.
STARR, CURRENT LAW OF CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE §§ 11:2-:44 (1977). A bona fide purchaser or encumbrancer takes interests in property with good faith, for value, and without
notice. A recorded notice of pendency would provide a purchaser or encumbrancer with constructive notice of its contents. Even without § 1908 or the common law lis pendens doctrine,
a validly filed notice presents relevant issues regarding the transferee's bona fide status. See
Ludvik v. James S. Jackson Co., 635 P.2d 1135 (Wyo. 1981) (recorded notice of pendency was
not given effect under the lis pendens doctrine, and actual notice provided did not place
Ludvik on inquiry so as to divest his bona fide status); see also 4 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA
PROCEDURE §§ 226-243, at 3354-77 (2d ed. 1971 & Supp. 1983). Section 1908 provides an
exception to the general rule that successors in interest during the pendency of an action are
bound by the judgment as privies through the mechanism of res judicata. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

§ 44 comment c (1972) (if a statute requires a claimant to

record a notice of lis pendens, a transferee may assume that property is not the subject of a
pending action if no lis pendens is recorded).
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the provisions. Whether the statute should be applied in such proceedings thus depends on whether the governmental policy expressed in the
statute encompasses the extraterritorial use. 99
Policies Underlying the Lis Pendens Statutes
The modern objectives of lis pendens law were succinctly summarized in United States v. Veon:10°
The lis pendens procedure was codified in order to create a fair
system for resolving-or better, for obviating-disputes between persons who are in the process of litigating an asserted interest in a given
piece of real property, and third persons who purchase (or lease, or
encumber) the subject property during the course of the litigation.
The evolution of the lis pendens doctrine in California reflects a continual attempt to balance the interests of those affected by lis pendens
laws. 01' The doctrine was originally formulated to prevent the frustration of judgments by pendente lite transfers.10 2 In this way, the doctrine
protected the interests of claimants and the interests of the state in
achieving justice and judicial economy. Subsequent statutory provisions,
which require the recordation of notice, ameliorate the hardship that the
10 3
doctrine imposed on prospective purchasers and encumbrancers.
More recent statutory provisions protect defendants and property owners
from unreasonable title encumbrances caused by the improper use of the
lis pendens procedures.l°4 Thus, for the use of lis pendens in extraterritorial actions to be proper, it must further the objectives of the lis
pendens statute and balance the interests of government, claimants, property owners, and prospective purchasers and encumbrancers.
Government Interests
The interests of the forum state and those of the situs state are affected by extraterritorial lis pendens. To advance its interests in judicial
economy and justice, the forum state seeks to prevent pendente lite transfers of property that would frustrate forum court judgments. While the
use of lis pendens in actions that concern property located in another
jurisdiction probably would alleviate the frustration of judgments, it also
may spawn additional litigation over the propriety of any notice filed.
Everything considered, however, the burden of such additional litigation
is likely to be outweighed by the benefit of protecting the enforceability of
99. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84.
100. 549 F. Supp. 274, 279 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
101. See generally Note, supra note 44, at 909-16 (evolution of the lis pendens statute in
California).
102. See supra notes 3-4 & accompanying text.
103. Sampson v. Ohleyer, 22 Cal. 200, 210 (1863); see Konold, supra note 25, at 1.
104. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 409(b)-(c), 409.1-.3, 409.55 (West 1973).
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the forum-state court's judgments. Thus, extraterritorial lis pendens promotes judicial economy in the forum state.
Interstate lis pendens will also promote judicial economy in the situs
state. By protecting judgments rendered by extraterritorial courts, the
situs-state judicial system avoids litigation over frustrated judgments and
also encourages litigants to utilize foreign forums when that alternative is

available.
Counterbalancing this benefit are the restrictions that such use of lis
pendens may place on the situs state's ability to control the disposition of
its land, to maintain the free transferability of its realty, and to keep its
records of title clear.105 The use of lis pendens in extraterritorial litigation could unreasonably burden the situs state's record keeping, for example, because notices of lis pendens from foreign actions may inject
error and uncertainty into the situs state's land records. Such errors un10 6
reasonably hinder the transferability of the situs state's land.
These adverse effects may arise for several reasons. First, a foreign
court may misapply local law.' 0 7 Second, interested persons at the situs
may encounter difficulty monitoring the extraterritorial action. Third,
and most important, there may be no mechanism by which affected persons can correct the record if errors arise.
Because notice of pendency may be filed without preliminary judicial approval, the mechanisms to monitor land records and to remove
105. See Hancock, supra note 13, at 1304 & n.28; cf Currie, supra note 13, at 632-34.
Allowing litigants in extraterritorial courts to record notices of lis pendens would probably
increase the overall number of lis pendens recorded. A lis pendens, by its purpose and nature,
casts a cloud on title, thereby reducing the transferability of the property. To the extent that
the number of improper notices of lis pendens is also increased, the California records of title
are unnecessarily encumbered. However, the intrusion of a notice of lis pendens on title probably does not constitute a breach of territorial jurisdiction. See supra notes 60-82 & accompanying text.
106. In his article arguing for the application of the full faith and credit clause of the
Constitution to foreign land decrees, Professor Brainerd Currie recognized the need for a
means to provide constructive notice in the situs state of claims pending in an extraterritorial
action. Currie, supra note 13, at 632-34. Professor Currie was reluctant to rely on the doctrine
of lis pendens to provide such notice for two major reasons. First, the situs state cannot be
compelled under the full faith and credit clause to provide such a mechanism for notice. Second, the "intrusion" into the land records by foreign documents would lead to "undesirable
complexities." Id. at 664-65 n.161. Professor Currie's solution to the problem of the frustration of foreign decrees was to "invoke the federal legislative power... under the full faith and
credit clause . . . [to] provide for the recordation at the situs of notice that an interest in the
land is claimed by virtue of the foreign proceeding or decree." Id. at 665 n.161. A similar
problem in bankruptcy-the acquisition of interests after the petition is filed-was solved in
this way. Professor Currie did not elaborate on why this solution would avoid the problem that
he associated with the recordation of actions under existing law.
107. The first factor is a problem inherent in a federal system of government that recognizes certain sovereign powers of the states. The risk of misapplication may be lessened somewhat by the considerable body of law which has been developed in this area and by the greater
frequency with which courts must now apply laws of other jurisdictions.
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inappropriate or erroneous notices of pendency are crucial. 10 8 Sections
409(b) and (c) of the California Code of Civil Procedure require notices
of pendency filed under section 409(a) to be served on adverse parties in
the action and on all owners of record. 10 9 Thus, those whose interests
will most likely be affected by the filing of a notice of pendency will have
notice that an action has been initiated, even if they are not parties to the
suit. The question remains, however, whether there are methods by
which such interested persons may remove an abusive or otherwise inappropriate notice of pendency.
In California actions, a party to the litigation may move to have the
notice of pendency expunged. 10 An expungement order is a judicial di2
rective 11 addressed to the recording clerk rather than to the parties.1
An expungement order, however, is unlikely to be an effective method for
removing inappropriate notices of pendency concerning extraterritorial
actions because a court in one state cannot compel the recording clerk in
3
another state to alter a recorded lis pendens."
A better mechanism for the removal of an improper lis pendens in
an extraterritorial action is the notice of withdrawal provided for in section 409.55.114 The extraterritorial court with personal jurisdiction over

the recording party and jurisdiction to adjudicate controversies regarding
the lis pendens could compel that party to record a notice of
withdrawal. 115
108. In addition to the detrimental effect on the governmental interest in maintaining ordered land records, the absence of a prompt means to challenge recorded notices may raise
substantial due process problems. See R. HERTZBERG & T. REGELE, supra note 74, at 14-16;
Note, supra note 44.
109. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 409(b)-(c) (West 1973).
110. Id. § 409.1-.2.
111. Although an expungement order is not an appealable, conclusive determination of
rights, Rebco Dev. Inc. v. Superior Court, 67 Cal. App. 3d 13, 17, 136 Cal. Rptr. 351, 353
(1977), it can be obtained upon a party's motion and the court's examination of affidavits,
counteraffidavits, and "such other proof as the court may permit." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 409.1 (West 1973).
112. Compare CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 409.1 (West 1973) with id. § 409.55.
113. See supra note 86 (Congress could not compel states to record notices of actions in
federal courts); Currie, supra note 13, at 664 n. 161 (no basis in full faith and credit clause for
situs states to provide a recordation mechanism).
114. A notice of withdrawal is a notice withdrawing the lis pendens, recorded by the party
who originally recorded the lis pendens, thereby nullifying the lis pendens. CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 409.55 (West 1973).
115. Section 409.55 merely provides for the recordation of the notice to withdraw; it does
not provide criteria on which to base the order. Section 409.1 allows the court, on motion by
any party, to order the expungement of a recorded lis pendens unless the recording party can
prove that (1) the action affects title to or right of possession of the real property described in
the notice and (2) the action is commenced for a proper purpose and in good faith. CAL. CIv.
PROC. CODE § 409.1 (West Supp. 1984). The order expunging the lis pendens voids any actual
or constructive notice provided by lis pendens. Id; see Messner, The Jurisdictionof a Court of
Equity Over Persons to Compel the Doing of Acts Outside the TerritorialLimits of the State, in
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A mechanism to correct the record should also be available to
nonlitigant California residents who are not involved in the extraterritorial action but have interests in the California property that are affected
by the lis pendens. 116 In most circumstances, if an action has been
brought in a foreign jurisdiction rather than the situs jurisdiction, the
foreign forum is more convenient for one or both parties than the situs
forum. Yet nonparties whose interests are affected by the lis pendens and
who reside in the situs state could be inconvenienced if their only option
is to seek removal of the lis pendens through an action in the forum state.
Nonparty residents, therefore, need an appropriate remedy in a court of
the situs state. A separate action at the situs for an injunction to compel
the withdrawal of the notice may be possible if the situs court can obtain
personal jurisdiction over the party who recorded the lis pendens. 117 A
quiet title action at the situs may also be a possible means of removing a
lis pendens filed improperly in connection with an extraterritorial
action. 118
Because these procedures are available to correct the improper use
of lis pendens in extraterritorial actions, it is not likely that extraterritorial lis pendens would inject error into the situs state's land records or
unreasonably burden the title to situs state land. In addition, the forum
court would apply the law of the situs state to decide issues related to the
lis pendens. 11 9 The choice of a foreign forum, therefore, would not cause
the land records to be treated other than they would have been treated if
the situs state were the forum state. Finally, the situs state always has in
rem jurisdiction over the property and thus has the authority and mecha120
nisms to review errors of the record.
SELECTED READINGS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 291, 298-305 (M. Culp ed. 1956); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 53, 55, 102 (1971). The criteria established for

expungement in § 409.1, or a failure to meet the requirements for recordation set out in § 409,
could serve as a basis for such an order.
116. This situation could occur, for example, when the property is held jointly and the
litigation concerns the interest of one owner. In addition to California's interest in maintaining
clear records of title, the state has an interest in providing a forum for its residents who are
wronged by the improper use of lis pendens.
117. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 409.55 (West 1973).
118. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 760.010-.020 (West Supp. 1983). A quiet title action
may be brought to establish title to or interest in real property against adverse claims, including legal or equitable rights or a cloud on title. See Peery v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d. 837,
176 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1981); L. SIMES, supra note 16, at 125.

119. The recording system is a creature of the state, and, under the current laws of lis
pendens, a notice of pendency is a function of the recording system. See L. SIMEs, supra note
16, at 115, 119-21. Under a governmental interests analysis, the law of the state in which
property is situated is usually applied when issues affecting land or title are adjudicated. See
Hancock, supra note 13.
120.

Only the situs state has the power directly to adjudicate title to property located

within its jurisdiction. Redwood Inv. Co. v. Exley, 64 Cal. App. 455, 459, 221 P. 973, 975
(1923). Such in rem proceedings conclusively determine the status or disposition of the prop-
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In summary, extraterritorial lis pendens furthers judicial economy
in both the situs and forum states. The availability of mechanisms to
remedy possible misuse of lis pendens in a foreign court indicates there is
little danger that extraterritorial lis pendens will unreasonably disrupt
the situs state's land records. Thus, extraterritorial lis pendens would
adequately protect the pertinent interests of the forum and the situs state.
Claimants' Interests
A "claimant" is the party who has an affirmative claim that affects
the real property.' 21 The claimant does not want the property to be
alienated during the course of the action unless a purchaser or encumbrancer has notice of the claim because alienation without notice would
frustrate the claimant's recovery after a favorable judgment.
In the absence of an interstate lis pendens device, a claimant who
brings an action in a state other than the situs of the property could
obtain protection from an adverse pendente lite transfer by filing a parallel action in the situs state. 122 The claimant could then file a notice of lis
pendens in connection with the action in the situs court 12 3 or, in the
proper circumstances, could attach the property. 24 The claimant may
request that the situs action be stayed pending judgment in the extraterritorial action. 125 If the claimant prevails in the nonsitus action, the judgment may be enforced in the situs court. If the claimant does not prevail
action, the action in the situs court may be
in the extraterritorial
26
dismissed.'
A claimant may prefer this procedure over extraterritorial lis
pendens because the situs court maintains control of protective measures' 27 over the property. The claimant thereby avoids the potential
erty itself, in contrast to in personam proceedings which determine rights against specific persons. CompareBLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 713 (rev. 5th ed. 1979) (in rem defined as a "term
used to designate proceedings or actions instituted against the thing") (emphasis added) with
id. at 711 (in personam defined as "an act or proceeding. . . done or directed against or with
reference to a specific person"). For example, a person with an interest in the title to property
for which a notice of lis pendens has been recorded in California can bring an action to quiet
title in a California court. See, ag., Peery v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 837, 176 Cal. Rptr.
533 (1981) (action by pendente lite transferees to quiet title clouded by lis pendens was subsequently merged with main action).
121. The claimant may thus be the plaintiff or a defendant. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 409(a) (West Supp. 1984); see Arrow Sand and Gravel v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. App. 3d
971, 204 Cal. Rptr. 295 (1984).
122. See 1 B. WITKIN, supra note 98, §§ 289-295, at 829-37.
123. Assuming that the action affects title or right to possession and that the claimant
otherwise meets the recording requirements of § 409.
124. See 2 B. WITKIN, supra note 98, §§ 124-139, 309A, at 993-1005.
125. See I B. WITKIN, supra note 98, §§ 258-260, 289-295, at 798-800, 829-35.
126. See 4 B. WITKIN, supra note 98, §§ 43-59, at 3210-11.
127. The lis pendens and attachment of property discussed above, supra text accompany-
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problems of territorial jurisdiction,1 2 and the claimant's interests are
better protected because the situs forum can utilize in rem powers not
129
available to the nonsitus court.
Generally, however, a claimant chooses to bring suit in a nonsitus
state because the situs state is inconvenient or lacks jurisdiction. In such
circumstances, the claimant is unable to file a parallel action at the situs
of the affected property; 30 thus, the availability of lis pendens in the extraterritorial action would provide the best protection against the transfer of the property during the pendency of the action.' 3 ' Furthermore,
even though filing a parallel action at the situs is possible, the additional
burden of filing and maintaining a separate action may make this alternative unattractive. Thus, the use of lis pendens in extraterritorial actions
furthers the interests of claimants.
ing notes 123-24, are available through the situs action and therefore are under the control of
the situs court.
128. Attachment is a provisional remedy available only through the situs court. See supra
notes 77-82 & accompanying text. It appears that a lis pendens would not constitute a direct
affect on property and therefore is not unavailable in extraterritorial actions as a violation of
territorial sovereignty. See supra notes 60-82 & accompanying text.
129. For example, a quiet title action can only be brought in the situs state. See supra
notes 116-18 & accompanying text.
130. For example, a divorce proceeding must be brought at the domicile of at least one of
the parties; but if neither party is domiciled in the state where the property is situated, no
dissolution action could be brought in the situs state. See 6 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW §§ 71-89, at 4943-60 (8th ed. 1974 & Supp. 1982). While a notice of pendency
may usually be filed in a divorce action that affects property, see Parker v. Superior Court, 9
Cal. App. 3d 397, 88 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1970), the claimant in this situation could not file a
parallel action at the situs.
131. The forum court may be able to enjoin the property owner from transferring or encumbering the land during the proceedings, or the court may establish a constructive trust
over the property. Neither remedy, however, would adequately prevent frustration of the decree by transfer to a bona fide purchaser or encumbrancer without notice. Violating an injunction is an act in contempt of the issuing court. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1209(a)(5)
(West Supp. 1984). The court's jurisdiction to punish such violations is limited, however, to
persons under its jurisdiction because an injunction is an equitable device that acts in personam against the parties of the suit. See Messner, The Jurisdictionof a Court of Equity Over
Persons to Compel the Doing of Acts Outside the TerritorialLimits of the State, 14 MINN. L.
REV. 494, 514-15 (1930). In addition, an injunction will not be enforced against nonparties
such as bona fide purchasers who have no knowledge of the injunction. See generally 43A
C.J.S. Injunctions §§ 288, 296, 298 (1978) (persons liable for violation). A constructive trust
creates an in personam obligation against the trustee and is not enforceable against bona fide
purchasers without knowledge of the trust. See generally 89 C.J.S. Trusts § 139 (1955 & Supp.
1984) (constructive trusts described); 90 C.J.S. Trusts §§ 442-446 (1955 & Supp. 1984) (enforcement against bonafide purchasers).
Even if no such remedial devices are used, the prevailing party may protect its judgment
and decree through res judicata principles which bind the subject properties' successors in
interest. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 44 comment a (1972). This principle does not appear to apply to situations in which the successor in interest is a bona fide
purchaser without notice of the action. See id. § 44 comment c and reporter's note.
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Property Owners' Interests
Property owners have an interest in maintaining clear title to their
property. Thus, they are concerned about the restrictions that a notice of
lis pendens places on the transferability of their land.132 In an effort to
alleviate the burden of a restriction on transfer of land, California statutes require prompt notice to record owners of any notice of pendency
recorded against their property.1 33 California statutes also provide for
34
the expeditious removal of an improper notice of pendency.1
These statutory protections for property owners may be less effective
when lis pendens is ified concerning an extraterritorial action rather than
an action at the situs. Although the safeguard of notice is still effective,
the mechanism for removal of improper notice of pendency may be less
useful. Litigants in an extraterritorial action probably cannot obtain an
expungement order that would compel the correction of a lis pendens
error. 135 The loss of this safeguard may be counterbalanced by the availability of other mechanisms in both the situs and forum states, 136 as discussed above, open to holders of property interests affected by
extraterritorial actions. Because a statutory right to attorney's fees exists
only for motions to expunge a lis pendens, however, a property owner
could not recoup attorney's fees expended in correcting an erroneous no37
tice of pendency.1
Interests of Prospective Purchasers and Encumbrancers
Prospective transferees and encumbrancers have an interest in
avoiding possible litigation over the interests they acquire that may frustrate extraterritorial judgments. Utilizing lis pendens in connection with
extraterritorial actions furthers this interest because notice of lis pendens
provides prospective transferees and encumbrancers with information
they require to make appropriate decisions regarding their transactions.1 38 A high degree of protection against the invalidation of title
transactions is important primarily when information regarding title is
132. See, e.g., Note, supra note 44.
133. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 409(b)-(c), 409.1-.3, 409.55 (West 1973).
134. Id.
135.

See supra notes 110-13 & accompanying text.

136. See supra notes 110-18 & accompanying text.
137. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 409.3 (West 1973). The California statute limits the
use of expungement to the court that hears the underlying action. Id. §§ 409.1-.2. Thus, parties seeking relief in the situs state from an improper lis pendens filed in a foreign action would
not be able to benefit from the attorney's fees provision in the lis pendens statutes.
138. The transferee may be forced to defend the transfer in litigation brought by interested
third parties seeking to void the transfer for either reasons of equity or res judicata. See supra
note 131. In addition, should the transfer be set aside, the transferee will be burdened with
obtaining indemnification from the pendente lite transferor for the voided transaction.
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difficult to obtain. 139 Given the prevalent use of title insurance in real
estate dealings and the accessibility of records of title, prospective purchasers and encumbrancers will be adequately protected where notices of
pending extraterritorial actions are systematically recorded.
Exterritorial Lis Pendens and the Objectives of Lis Pendens Statutes
The objective of the lis pendens doctrine is to prevent the frustration
of judgments and decrees by pendente lite tranfers of property interests.
The extraterritorial use of lis pendens furthers this goal.
Without the use of a lis pendens, the interests of property owners
and prospective purchasers and encumbrancers are protected to the detriment of claimants in nonsitus actions. Property owners do not suffer
restrictions on the alienability of their land, and prospective transferees
are not deemed to have knowledge of pending claims; claimants, however, may not obtain the full extent of their judgments. The availability
of extraterritorial lis pendens restores the balance of interests to that
struck in situs actions and more closely approximates the goals of the lis
pendens doctrine. Extraterritorial lis pendens furthers the interests of
the government and claimants, yet slightly diminishes the interests of
property owners because property is more likely to be burdened by an
unwarranted notice of pendency. Prospective purchasers and encumbrancers receive more information about actions that may affect the
property and could avoid the burdens of litigation caused by the transfer
of property during extraterritorial actions of which they had no actual
notice. Thus, although extraterritorial application of lis pendens goes beyond the operation of the common law doctrine,1 40 it furthers the goal of
the lis pendens statutes.
Requirements Under Section 409: Whether the Extraterritorial Action
Affects Title to or Right to Possession of Real Property
Although access to section 409 procedures by litigants in extraterritorial actions may not conflict with the policies underlying the lis
pendens statute, other requirements of the statute could preclude this
use. Section 409(a) of the California Code of Civil Procedure requires
that the action related to the notice be one "concerning real property or
139.

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

§ 44 (1972). Comment c to § 44

states in part:
The purpose of [lis
pendens] procedures is to warn potential transferees of the pending litigation so that they may guide themselves accordingly. When no such notice
has been given, a transferee is entitled to assume that the property is not the subject
of a pending action. Unless he otherwise has knowledge of the action's pendency, he
should not be burdened with the risk that compliance with the procedures would
have overcome.
140. See supra notes 19-30 & accompanying text.
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affecting"concerning
the title or the right of possession of real property." 141 The
.phrase
real property" has been construed as equivalent to
the phrase "affecting the title or the right of possession of real property,"
but distinct from "involving real property." 142 A party need not claim
title to the property affected by the action to file a notice properly under
section 409.' 43
A court cannot directly affect title to property that lies outside its
territorial jurisdiction. 144 A court with in personam jurisdiction over the
parties, however, may act in equity to compel the parties to affect property that is situated in another jurisdiction. 145 The court may then enforce this decree through its contempt powers and other available civil
proceedings. 46 Alternatively, the prevailing party may seek enforcement
of the decree in the situs jurisdiction. 47 In California, the proceedings of
an out-of-state court will be given res judicata effect under the full faith
and credit clause of the United States Constitution. 48 Enforcement of a
nonmonetary decree, however, requires a separate California

proceeding. 149
In the following section the Note considers whether extraterritorial
judgments that do not directly affect title to California property, and
which can only be enforced in California through proceedings of a California court, emanate from actions that "affect title or the right of possession" to California realty so as to support the recordation of a notice of
lis pendens.
The Standardin CaliforniaActions
Actions in rem-such as actions to quiet title, actions to partition
property, eminent domain proceedings, and actions regarding abandoned
141. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 409(a)-(c) (West 1973). See generally R. HERTZBERG
REGELE, supra note 74, at 30-36.

& T.

142. Kendall-Brief Co. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. App. 3d 462,466-67, 131 Cal. Rptr. 515,
518 (1976); Allied E. Fin. v. Goheen Enters., 265 Cal. App. 2d 131, 71 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1968);
see also United States v. Veon, 549 F. Supp. 274, 278 n.9 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (noting accord with
Kendall-Brief and Goheen in construing statutory language).
143. Kendall-Brief Co. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. App. 3d at 465-66, 131 Cal. Rptr. at
519.
144. Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909); Melvin v. Carl, 118 Cal. App. 249, 4 P.2d 954
(1931).
145. Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. at 9; Tomaier v. Tomaier, 23 Cal. 2d 754, 760, 146 P.2d 905,
908 (1944); Mills v. Mills, 147 Cal. App. 2d 107, 116, 305 P.2d 61, 67 (1956); Redwood Inv.
Co. v. Exley, 64 Cal. App. 455, 459, 221 P. 973, 975 (1923).
146. This is true as long as the noncomplying individual is within the court's jurisdiction.
Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. at 9-10; Guilloz v. Parkinson, 204 Cal. 441, 268 P. 635 (1928).
147. Redwood Inv. Co. v. Exley, 64 Cal. App. at 459, 221 P. at 975.
148. Rozan v. Rozan, 49 Cal. 2d 322, 317 P.2d 11 (1957); Farley v. Farley, 227 Cal. App.
2d 1, 6, 38 Cal. Rptr. 357, 361 (1964); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1913 (West 1983); see 4 B.
WITKIN, supra note 98, § 156, at 3301-02.
149. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1913 (West 1983).
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or escheated property--directly affect property and therefore support a
valid lis pendens.' 50 Because the court's jurisdiction in such proceedings
is based on the location of the property, such actions affecting title are
beyond the jurisdiction of courts located outside the situs state.15 Other
actions that affect property so as to support a valid lis pendens include
actions to rescind contracts for the sale of realty, 152 actions for the specific performance of contracts to convey realty, 53 and actions to impose
actions need not be
a constructive trust on real property.' 5 4 These
55
brought only in the court of the situs state.'
An action that may be satisfied by a monetary judgment, though it
concerns realty, will not justify a notice of pendency.1 56 The complaint
or cross-complaint must set forth a cause of action that would affect the
title or right of possession of the specific real property described in the
notice of pendency. 157 Whether the action sufficiently affects this interest
depends on the facts of the case. In Empfield v. Superior Court,'58 for
example, the California Court of Appeal directed a superior court to
enter an order to expunge a notice of lis pendens filed in a foreclosure
action. Although other foreclosure actions have supported a valid lis
pendens, 59 the court held that the property in Empfield was claimed
"only for its value as a source of future income and support."'' 60 The lis
pendens was thus improper. Similarly, in Coppinger v. Superior Court,16 1
the California Court of Appeal held that an action to impose a constructive trust was a suitable action for lis pendens. Because the plaintiff's
pendens under authorizing stat150. Some of these actions require the claimant to file lis
utes. See R. HERTZBERG & T. REGELE, supra note 74, for a compilation of actions which
require lispendens.
151. See supra notes 60-63 & accompanying text.
152. Wilkins v. Oken, 157 Cal. App. 2d 603, 321 P.2d 876 (1958) (action for the rescission
of a sale of land supports lis pendens).
153. Abbott v. 76 Land & Water Co., 161 Cal. 42, 118 P. 425 (1911) (lis pendens allowed
in action for specific performance on contract related to realty).
154. Coppinger v. Superior Court, 134 Cal. App. 3d 883, 185 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1982) (action
to impose constructive trust on realty supports lis pendens).
155. See, e.g., Promis v. Duke, 208 Cal. 420, 281 P. 613 (1929) (action for rescission of
contract for sale of property brought in California on lands in British Columbia); Mills v.
Mills, 147 Cal. App. 2d 107, 305 P.2d 611 (1956) (constructive trust imposed on Illinois realty
in California action); Redwood Inv. Co. v. Exley, 64 Cal. App. 455, 221 P. 973 (1923) (action
for specific performance in Kentucky to compel the conveyance of land in California).
156. Allied E. Fin. v. Goheen Enters., 265 Cal. App. 2d 131, 134, 71 Cal. Rptr. 126, 12728 (1968).
157. Kendall-Brief Co. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. App. 3d 462, 467, 131 Cal. Rptr. 515,
518 (1976). The federal district court in United States v. Veon, 549 F. Supp. 274, 279-80 (E.D.
Cal. 1982), interpreted the lis pendens statute and case law to require a pendente lite transferee's interest in the subject property.
158. 33 Cal. App. 3d 105, 108 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1973).
159. See, e.g., Martin v. Lawrence, 156 Cal. 191, 103 P. 913 (1909).
160. Empfield, 33 Cal. App. 3d at 108, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
161. 134 Cal. App. 3d 883, 185 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1982).
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the court held
interest in the property was purely monetary, 1however,
62
that expungement was the appropriate remedy.
California courts also consider whether the judgment may be frustrated by a pendente lite transfer of the property to purchasers and encumbrancers who lack notice of the proceedings. For example, the
appellate court in Okuda v. Superior Court163 considered a lis pendens in
an action that sought an equitable lien on improved realty. The court
concluded that "[i]t should be. . .obvious, if plaintiffs. . . were unable
to record constructive notice of their action, that their equitable remedies
could be cut off the instant the owner sold the property to a good faith
purchaser." 164 The court consequently allowed the lis pendens to stand.
Is the StandardMet by ExtraterritorialActions?
Under the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution, 65 a state must accord a valid judgment of a court of another state
the same effect that it would have in the state of adjudication. 166 This
full credit extends to the res judicata effect of a final judgment on the
merits of a claim. 167 Under the doctrine of res judicata, once an issue is
fully adjudicated by a court with proper jurisdiction, the merits of the
issue may not be relitigated. 168 Thus, although courts may not directly
affect title to land outside their territorial jurisdiction, an extraterritorial
court may conclusively adjudicate the property rights between parties.
The extraterritorial court may also prescribe remedies that, once enforced, affect title and rights of possession. For example, an extraterritorial court may decree a conveyance of California property in an action
for the specific performance of a contract to convey realty. 169 If the parties voluntarily comply with the court's decree, the conveyance is recognized in California as a valid deed.' 7 0 If the parties do not comply and
the forum court compels the conveyance under its contempt powers,
then the transaction is also accepted in California and the deed is recognized as valid. 171 Alternatively, the prevailing party may seek enforcement of the decree in California by filing an action or special proceeding
162. Id. at 890-92, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 29-30.
163. 144 Cal. App. 3d 135, 192 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1983).
164. Id. at 140, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
165. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
166. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 109 (1963).
167. Farley v. Farley, 227 Cal. App. 2d 1, 6, 38 Cal. Rptr. 357, 361 (1964).
168. Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942). However, the
judgment may be appealed or attacked for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Durfee v. Duke, 375
U.S. at 109-10; Farley v. Farley, 227 Cal. App. 2d at 6, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 361; Redwood Inv.Co.
v. Exley, 64 Cal. App. 455, 458, 221 P. 973, 974 (1923).
169. Redwood Inv. Co. v. Exley, 64 Cal. App. at 459, 221 P. at 975.
170. In re Marriage of Fink, 25 Cal. 3d 877, 884 n.5, 160 Cal. Rptr. 516, 519 n.5 (1979).
171. Id.
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in California on the original judgment. 172 No material issues fully litigated in the original proceeding are reconsidered,1 73 and the losing party
has no significantly greater recourse against an extraterritorial decree
than a decree issued in California. The need for an action in the situs
state to effect enforcement of an extraterritorial decree thus does not appear to make the original court's decision less final or its remedy less
effective.
An extraterritorial decree, which establishes the equitable rights between the parties and may be enforced at the situs, would seem to justify
the use of lis pendens under section 409 by virtue of its similarity to an
74
equitable lien, which does support the filing of a notice of pendency.
The propriety of a lis pendens also depends on whether a particular remedy is susceptible to frustration by pendente lite transfers. 7 5 Any remedy of a situs court that may be frustrated by a pendente lite transfer is at
least as susceptible to frustration if rendered by a court in another state.
Bona fide purchasers of realty who lack both notice of the action and an
intent to defraud are equally immune from the effects of judgments,
whether rendered by extraterritorial courts or by situs courts. 176 Thus,
the pendente lite protection of judgments is as necessary in extraterritorial actions as it is in local actions.
In sum, section 409(a) requires that the action underlying the lis
pendens affects title to or possession of real property. It appears that
extraterritorial actions meet this requirement. An extraterritorial action
can determine the rights to title and to possession of property in another
172. Redwood Inv. Co. v. Exley, 64 Cal. App. at 459, 221 P. at 975; CAL. CIv. PROC.
1913 (West 1983).
173. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. at 115; Redwood Inv. Co. v. Exley, 64 Cal. App. at 459,
221 P. at 975.
174. Okuda v. Superior Court, 144 Cal. App. 3d 135, 192 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1983). The
court in Okuda held that an action to impose an equitable lien on real property to secure
payment of monetary damages affected title or right of possession as required by the lis
pendens statute. The court explained:
[I]t is beyond dispute that an equitable lien is a direct charge or encumbrance upon
property such that the property may itself be proceeded against in an equitable action
and either sold or sequestered, and its proceeds applied in favor of the person in
whose favor it exists ....
Therefore an action to establish or foreclose an equitable
lien is clearly one that affects the title or right to possession of real property.
Id. at 141, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 392. At the very least, an extraterritorial decree that compels
action related to specific property seems to establish an equitable right upon which an action to
enforce the decree may be based.
175. Okuda v. Superior Court, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 140, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
176. Extraterritorial judgments and decrees lack the protections, such as attachment,
available to situs judgments and decrees, because of the situs court's in rem powers. See supra
notes 60-63, 78-81 & accompanying text. Furthermore, increasing the distance of the forum
court from the property decreases the chance that potential purchasers or encumbrancers
would obtain knowledge of the asserted claims. See L. SIMES, supra note '16, at 116 (lis
pendens is especially necessary when the court lacks in rem power over the property).
CODE §
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state through the court's jurisdiction over the parties. Lis pendens is
needed in extraterritorial actions because extraterritorial courts may prescribe remedies that could be frustrated by transfers to persons without
notice. Decrees in extraterritorial actions that sufficiently affect property
therefore merit the same protection as similar decrees in actions brought
within the situs state.
Conclusion
The common law doctrine of lis pendens requires that the affected
property be within the territorial jurisdiction of the adjudicating court.
The nature and operation of lis pendens in California, however, does not
necessarily support this territorial restriction. The California lis pendens
statutes do not expressly prohibit a lis pendens in connection with extraterritorial actions affecting California property. Such actions can affect
the title to or the right of possession of realty in a manner that fulfills the
requirements of the lis pendens statute. The notice of pendency itself
does not directly affect title to property, however, and therefore does not
violate restrictions of territorial sovereignty.
California lis pendens law neither prohibits nor expressly sanctions
the recordation of a notice of pendency in conjunction with an action
commenced outside the state. Such a use of lis pendens would further
the objectives of the common law doctrine of lis pendens and the California lis pendens statutes. Furthermore, recordation of a notice of pendency strikes a balance for the interests of the situs state, the claimants in
the nonsitus action, the property owners, and the prospective purchasers
and encumbrancers that does not differ substantially from the balance
achieved by the use of lis pendens in situs actions. Thus, the recordation
of notices of pendency in conjunction with out-of-state actions affecting
California property is a practical and beneficial application of the lis
pendens mechanism.
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